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I. INTRODUCTION
You asked that I draft supermajority voting rights provisions for
the Certificate of Designations for a series of preferred stock that
University, Inc. (“University”), a Delaware corporation, will issue to our
client, Patricia Knox (“Knox”), a Tennessee resident. The draft provisions
are attached as Rider A. With your approval, the supermajority voting
provisions in Rider A will be incorporated into the Certificate of
Designations.
This memorandum provides the transactional context for the
Series A Cumulative Preferred Stock, identifies the legal issues involved in
applying the relevant law to our client’s concerns, and analyzes the drafting
decisions that address these issues. Terms not defined in this
memorandum maintain their definitions from Rider A or the following
glossary.
II. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT
Knox, our client and a Tennessee resident, is a founder of University,
a Delaware public corporation that manufactures and sells collegiate
apparel around the country. With in-store sales declining and operational
challenges mounting due to COVID-19, University has faced significant
financial difficulties since March 2020. To continue operations and
explore ways to adapt its business to a socially distanced market, University
needs capital. Knox wants to pursue a private placement with University
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to contribute capital to help University succeed despite these unexpected,
temporary challenges. The parties have agreed that University will issue
preferred stock to Knox in this private placement.
Knox is concerned about what business decisions University
might make in light of such unprecedented times and financial difficulties
and how those decisions could affect her investment. Consequently,
Knox would like increased control over the approval of changes to
University’s Certificate of Incorporation or Certificate of Designations
that could be detrimental to her investment. Knox would also like to
protect her return on investment by maintaining the priority of the
preferred stock she will receive in this offering. I have focused on this
protective purpose when making drafting decisions.
University
appreciates Knox’s concerns and has expressed that it would like to agree
to provisions that honor her interests, but the board has also expressed
that it is conscious of its fiduciary duties to all University stockholders and
does not want to authorize preferred stock rights that would constitute a
violation of those duties.
The offering will consist of Series A Cumulative Perpetual
Preferred Stock (“Series A Preferred Stock”) issued by University to Knox.
University has only issued one class of common stock, which is listed on
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and has a current trading price
of twenty dollars per share. The common stock is broadly held; Knox
only owns three percent of University’s outstanding common stock.
Under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (“DGCL”)
Section 151, University’s Certificate of Incorporation authorizes the board
to issue 98,000,000 shares of common stock.1 90,000,000 of these shares
have been issued and are outstanding. University has not issued preferred
stock before, but its Certificate of Incorporation authorizes the board to
issue 2,000,000 shares of preferred stock and provides for “blank check
preferred stock” under DGCL Sections 151(a) and (g).2 The blank check
preferred stock provision allows the board to authorize the issuance of
preferred stock and to set, by resolution, “the voting powers, designations,
preferences, rights, and qualifications” of such stock.3 Thus, University
will issue 1,500,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock to Knox, par value
of five cents per share and an initial value of thirty-five dollars per share,

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (2020).
Id.
3 tit. 8, § 151(a), (g).
1

2
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for Knox’s $52,500,000 investment, as authorized by DGCL Section 161
and the Certificate of Incorporation.4
This offering is a private placement that qualifies for an exemption
from registration under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.5
Another associate is addressing the securities regulations details of this
transaction. This associate will apply for an exemption from registration
to comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act
of 1933 and will take additional measures to comply with the relevant
Delaware securities law.6 Additionally, because University is listed on the
NYSE, it must follow the Listed Company Manual.7 However, in this
transaction, University does not need to seek shareholder approval under
Section 312.03(c).8
III. DRAFTING CHOICES
Below I identify key issues I resolved in drafting the supermajority
voting provisions for this transaction.
I.

Can supermajority voting rights fully protect Knox’s investment
in the Series A Preferred Stock from amendments to the
Certificate of Incorporation or the Certificate of Designations?

One of the most important issues for Knox is that her investment
will be protected from changes to University’s Certificate of Incorporation
or Certificate of Designations or any similar document that would
adversely affect the rights or preferences of the Series A Preferred Stock.
A provision requiring a supermajority class vote to approve an
amendment, alteration, or repeal of the certificate of incorporation or the
certificate of designations is a common feature of a certificate of
designations for supermajority voting preferred stock.9 Both parties agree
See tit. 8, § 161.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 73-208(b) (2020).
7 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, PREFACE TO THE NEW
EDITION, https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-companymanual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D-WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-0 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
8 Id. § 312.03(c)(2).
9 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. (Ex. 3.1, Form 10-Q) (Aug. 5, 2019); Occidental Petrol. Corp.,
4
5

2021]

SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RIGHTS

55

that this is a normative and acceptable supermajority voting right for the
Series A Preferred Stock. However, Delaware decisional law indicates that
such provisions can leave the preferred stock vulnerable to amendments
to the certificate of incorporation that occur through merger or
consolidation.10 Thus, Knox desires a provision that also protects against
such amendments.
II.

Can the Supermajority Voting Rights protect Series A Preferred
Stock’s priority against only stock or all financial instruments?

Another important issue for Knox is protecting her investment’s
priority as to dividends or the distribution of assets upon the liquidation,
dissolution, or winding up of University. This priority is particularly crucial
to Knox in light of University’s recent financial difficulties. Under
Delaware law, a series of preferred stock may be granted supermajority
voting rights which are required to authorize the issuance of or increase in
the amount of stock or instruments convertible into or carrying a right to
purchase stock ranking prior to the preferred stock with respect to
dividends or the distribution of assets upon liquidation, dissolution, or
winding up of the corporation.11 Both parties have agreed to the inclusion
of this normative provision, but Knox wants to protect the Series A
Preferred Stock’s priority against all instruments issued by University, not
only against stock. However, Delaware law constrains the priority
preferred stock may enjoy.12
III.

Do the Supermajority Voting Rights protect Knox’s investment
without compromising the University board’s fiduciary duties to
University’s common stockholders?

Finally, University and Knox negotiated whether the Series A
Preferred Stock would possess supermajority voting rights relating to all
matters submitted to holders of University Common Stock not already
Securities Purchase Agreement (Ex. 10.1, Form 8-K) (May 3, 2019); TCF Fin. Corp.,
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of TCF Financial Corporation (Ex.
3.1, Form 10-Q) (May 3, 2018); Phillips Van Heusen Corp., Certificate of Designations
of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock (Ex. 3.1, Form 8-K) (May 12, 2010).
10 See Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 853 (Del. 1998).
11 See Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 416, at *12–13
(May 6, 1985).
12 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281 (2020).
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included in the Section 7(b) provisions. Knox suggested this additional
provision because she wants the right to exercise more control over
University’s decisions in its time of financial difficulty to further protect
her significant investment.13 However, University expressed concern
about giving such power to a series of preferred stock, citing the board’s
fiduciary duties to University and all University stockholders.14
IV. ANALYSIS OF DRAFTING CHOICES
I.

Protection against Amendments to the Certificate of
Incorporation Materially and Adversely Affecting the Rights and
Preferences of Series A Preferred Stock

In Section 7(b)(i) of Rider A, I drafted the supermajority voting
rights provision to require the affirmative vote of sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of all of the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock before
authorizing any amendment to University’s Certificate of Incorporation
that will “adversely affect the powers, preferences, privileges or rights of
the Series A Preferred Stock.”15 This language will allow Knox to use the
supermajority voting rights to protect the rights and privileges of Series A
Preferred Stock from disadvantageous amendments and, therefore,
protect her equity investment. In drafting this provision, I relied on
Delaware precedent transaction documents and decisional law.16 Most
certificates of designations for preferred stock with supermajority voting

See Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 164
(2014) (“[P]referred shareholders must protect themselves with contract-like covenants
in the certificate of designation . . . .”).
14 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur analysis begins
with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of the corporation’s stockholders.”); William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt, &
Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware
Law, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (2012) (“When making corporate decisions, directors
must fulfill the traditional duties of care and loyalty in order to satisfy their fiduciary
obligations to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Randy J. Holland, Delaware
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 681–82 n.51 (2009)
(“good faith may be described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that
includes the duties of care and loyalty”) (quoting Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006)).
15 See infra Rider A(b)(i).
16 See sources cited supra note 9.
13

2021]

SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RIGHTS

57

rights include a provision that provides voting rights over such
amendments.17
To provide Knox with greater voting rights in this provision and,
therefore, greater protection for the rights and privileges of Series A
Preferred Stock, I tailored the language of this provision to also apply to
amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation that take effect through
“merger, consolidation, or otherwise.” This expansion was necessary
because, under DGCL Section 251, a merger or consolidation can affect a
certificate of incorporation in a variety of ways.18 Moreover, while the
term “otherwise” may appear imprecise, I included the phrase “merger,
consolidation, or otherwise” to invoke specific Delaware decisional law
that supports preferred stockholders’ right to a class vote on a merger or
consolidation, described in DGCL Section 251(a), which will affect a
corporation’s certificate of incorporation.19
This additional language provides critical protection for Knox’s
investment because Delaware courts consistently acknowledge that this
language is outcome determinative. 20 Delaware courts will not construe a
voting rights provision as giving stockholders the right to vote on
amendments to a certificate of incorporation effectuated through merger
or consolidation without this phrase.21 University will likely accept this
additional language because it retains the qualification that an amendment
subject to a vote by holders of Series A Preferred Stock must be an
amendment that would “adversely affect the powers, preferences,
privileges or rights of the Series A Preferred Stock.” Thus, Knox would
not possess supermajority voting power over every DGCL Section 251(a)
event.
See sources cited supra note 9.
Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 850 (Del. 1998) (explaining that a
merger or consolidation can affect the certificate of incorporation through amendments
to the certificate of incorporation, displacement and substitution of the certificate of
incorporation by merger, or displacement and substitution of the certificate of
incorporation by consolidation).
19 Elliott Assocs., 715 A.2d at 855; Greenmont Capital Partners I, LP v. Mary’s Gone
Crackers, Inc., No. 7265-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 236, at *20 (Sept. 28, 2012);
Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. 19719, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90, at
*30 (July 15, 2002).
20 Elliott Assocs., 715 A.2d at 855.
21 Benchmark Capital, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90, at *30; see also Greenmont Capital, 2012 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 236, at *20 (citing Warner Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 583
A.2d 962, 967 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he principle of Delaware Corporation law that any rights
or preferences of preferred stock must be expressed clearly.”)).
17
18
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Priority of Series A Preferred Stock

In Section 7(b)(ii) of Rider A, I drafted the supermajority voting
rights provision to require a vote of two-thirds of the holders of Series A
Preferred Stock to issue, authorize, or increase the amount of stock with
priority over the Series A Preferred Stock. Also, a two-thirds vote of Series
A Preferred Stock holders is required to issue or authorize any obligation
or security convertible into or evidencing the right to purchase a class or
series of stock with such priority. In drafting this provision, I relied on
Delaware precedent transaction documents and decisional law, which
support the validity of this supermajority voting right.22 I included this
provision in the supermajority voting rights because it allows Knox,
through the voting rights she will possess as a holder of Series A Preferred
Stock, to protect her financial rights as a Series A Preferred Stockholder
by maintaining her investment’s priority as to dividends and the
distribution of assets upon liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of
University.
The protection provided by this provision has a critical
vulnerability, however. The provision only applies to the issuance,
authorization, or increase in the amount of stock or the issuance or
authorization of instruments that may convert into stock. Due to the
provision’s limited application, Knox will not be able to protect her
investment’s priority against other instruments. This weakness has also
been discussed in Delaware decisional law.23
I considered altering the boilerplate language of this provision to
require a supermajority vote of approval from Series A Preferred
Stockholders for the issuance, authorization, or increase in the amount of
any instrument ranking prior to the Series A Preferred Stock in order to
better protect Knox’s financial rights. However, this language, or a
substantively similar revision to the provision, is not possible because
DGCL Section 281 provides that debt will always have priority over

Northern Trust Corp., Certificate of Designation of Series E Non-Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock (Ex. 3.1, Form 8-K) (Oct. 31, 2019); Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Inc., supra note 9; Blockchain Holdings Capital Ventures, Inc., Certificate of Designation,
Preferences and Other Rights of the Class A Preferred Super Majority Voting Stock (Ex.
4.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 17, 2018).
23 Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No. 7366, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 416, *12–
13 (May 6, 1985).
22
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equity.24 Additionally, decisional law and scholarship offer no relief from
this rule.25 Thus, this provision has been drafted to protect Knox’s
financial rights in the Series A Preferred Stock to the extent possible. The
statutory limitation on this provision will likely cause this provision to be
viewed favorably by University because it does not restrict University’s
issuance of debt to raise capital, except in the case of convertible debt.
III.

The Balance Between Series A Preferred Stock Voting Rights
and University’s Board of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties

Although DGCL Section 151(a) grants corporations the authority
to determine the voting rights of a series of stock,26 fiduciary duties will
restrain University from approving the sweeping supermajority voting
rights Knox requested. Knox has expressed interest in a supermajority
voting provision that would allow her to vote on all matters presented to
University’s common stockholders and to possess voting power equal to
a supermajority of the common stock votes. There are precedent
transactions in Delaware that afford such extensive supermajority voting
rights to preferred stockholders.27 However, these provisions are not
common and are likely the result of unique, highly negotiated transactions.
Such provisions, therefore, do not provide reliable drafting guidance.28
Further, decisional law indicates that such sweeping supermajority
voting rights are inconsistent with a board of directors’ fiduciary duties
because such supermajority voting rights effectively give a single
stockholder veto power over all stockholder matters.29 University’s
common stockholders have a right to vote.30 Therefore, a violation of the
common stockholders’ voting rights through the board’s approval of
supermajority voting rights for all common stockholder voting matters
would demonstrate a “deliberate disregard of the whole body of
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281 (2020).
Warren v. King, 108 U.S. 389, 400 (1883) (finding preferred stock does not have
priority over debt).
26 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2020).
27 Blockchain Holdings Capital Ventures, Inc., supra note 22; Phillips Van Heusen Corp.,
supra note 9.
28 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Michael A. Woronoff & Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Innovative
Transactional Pedagogies, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 243, 251 (2011) (discussing the importance of
precedent transaction documents).
29 Lipton v. News Int’l, Plc 514 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 1986).
30 See tit. 8, § 212.
24

25
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stockholders,” and would breach the board’s duty of care.31 Thus, the
exclusion of such a broad voting rights provision should appeal to both
parties, as this drafting decision will prevent future litigation about
whether the board violated its fiduciary duties to University stockholders
by harming the rights of University stockholders.
IV.

Minor Drafting Choices

I set the supermajority voting requirement at sixty-six and twothirds percent because it is one of the more modest supermajority voting
percentages I found in decisional law.32 Although Delaware law grants a
corporation the authority to determine the voting rights of a series of stock
in DGCL Section 151(a),33 adopting a moderate supermajority voting
requirement is a way to convey to University that Knox does not wish to
wield unreasonable control, especially if additional shares of Series A
Preferred Stock are later issued.
I also decided to format the Certificate of Designations with subheaders. Some precedent transaction documents used a format similar to
that used in the Certificate of Designations below, while others used
longer paragraphs without sub-headers.34 I adopted the sub-header format
to improve the readability of the provision. This format also made drafting
the provision more efficient because it eliminated the need to repeat the
leading language of Section 7(b) that applies to the provisions of Sections
7(b)(i) & (ii).

Lafferty, Schmidt & Wolfe, Jr., supra note 14, at 843 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1982) (“Delaware courts apply a ‘gross negligence’ standard to
determine whether a board has satisfied its duty of care when making a corporate decision
. . . . Delaware courts have defined gross negligence as ‘reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the
bounds of reason.’” (quoting Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150,
192 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citation omitted))).
32 Seibert v. Gulton Indus., No. 5631, 1979 Del. Ch. LEXIS 485, at *7–8 (June 21, 1979);
Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 24 (1938) (holding a supermajority
voting requirement of 75% of the preferred stock valid).
33 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a).
34 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., supra note 9.
31
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RIDER A
CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATIONS OF SERIES A
CUMULATIVE PERPETUAL PREFERRED STOCK OF
UNIVERSITY, INC.
Section 7. Voting Rights.
(a) General. Except as provided below, the holders of Series A Preferred
Stock have no voting rights.
(b) Series A Preferred Stock Voting Rights. Unless the vote or consent
of the holders of a greater number of shares shall then be required by
law, the affirmative vote or consent of the holders of at least 66-2/3%
of all of the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock at the time
outstanding, voting separately as a class, shall be required to authorize:
(i) Authorization of Senior Stock. Any amendment, alteration,
or repeal of the Certificate of Incorporation or the Bylaws,
whether by merger, consolidation, or otherwise, which will
materially and adversely affect the powers, preferences,
privileges or rights of the Series A Preferred Stock, taken as a
whole; or
(ii) Amendment of Series A Preferred Stock. Any amendment
or alteration of the Certificate of Incorporation to issue,
authorize, or increase the amount of, or to issue or authorize
any obligation or security convertible into or evidencing the
right to purchase, any additional class or series of stock ranking
prior to the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock and any
Parity Stock as to dividends or the distribution of assets upon
liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation;
provided, however, that for all purposes of this Section 7(b), the following will
not be deemed to adversely affect the powers, preferences, privileges or
rights of the Series A Preferred Stock: (i) any increase in the amount of the
authorized or issued Series A Preferred stock; or (ii) the creation and
issuance, or an increase in the authorized or issued amount, of any Parity
Stock or any other series of Preferred Stock of the Corporation ranking
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junior to the Series A Preferred Stock with respect to the payment of
dividends (whether such dividends are cumulative or non-cumulative) and
the distribution of assets upon liquidation, dissolution or winding up of
the Corporation.
GLOSSARY
(a) “Board of Directors” means the board of directors of the
Corporation, including any duly authorized committee thereof.
(b) “Bylaws” means the bylaws of the Corporation, as they may be
amended from time to time.
(c) “Certificate of Designations” means this Certificate of
Designations relating to the Series A, as it may be amended from
time to time.
(d) “Certificate of Incorporation” means the Certificate of
Incorporation of the Corporation, as amended from time to time.
(e) “Common Stock” means the Corporation’s common stock, par
value $0.01 per share, of the Corporation.
(f) “Corporation” means University, Inc., a Delaware corporation.
(g) “Parity Stock” means any class or series of stock of the
Corporation (other than Series A) that ranks equally with Series A
both in the payment of dividends and in the distribution of assets
on any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation
(in each case without regard to whether dividends accrue on a
cumulative or non-cumulative basis).
(h) “Preferred Stock” means any and all series of preferred stock of
the Corporation, including the Series A Preferred Stock.
(i) “Series A Preferred Stock” means the Corporation’s Series A
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock.

